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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
U.C.A. § 49-1-610(5) allows a member who is apprieved by a decision of the Utah 
State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review by complying with the 
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act." 
U.C.A. §63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or other appellate 
court designated by statute to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative hearings. 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the final orders and decrees resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did th Board properly state and interpret the administrative hearsay rules in 
its Order? 
2. Does the statute placing the burden of proof on Petitioner place any burden 
of proof on the Board? 
3. Did the Board have substantial evidence to support its finding that 
Petitioner failed to meet the standards for total disability? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Petitioner may only be granted relief if, on the basis of the factual record, the Court 
determines that she has been prejudiced by Board action that is not supported by 
1 
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substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
The Appellate Court does not conduct a de novo credibility determination or 
reweigh the evidence. Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 
(Utah 1993), nor will an agency's findings of fact be overturned if based on substantial 
evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible Hurley v. Board of 
Review of Industrial Comm'n.. 767 P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 1988.) It is the province of 
the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the agency to draw 
the inference. Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-103(9) 2000 
"'Total disability' means the complete inability, due to medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment, to engage in the employee's regular occupation 
during the elimination period and the first 24 months of disability benefits. 
Thereafter, 'total disability' means the complete inability, based solely on 
medically determinable physical impairment, to engage in any gainful occupation 
which is reasonable, considering the employees' education, training, and 
experience. Total disability' exists only if during any period of 'total disability' 
the employee is under the regular care of a physician other than the employee." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Utah State Retirement Board, adopted by 
the Board September 26, 2002, denying Joanna Murphy ("Petitioner") long-term 
2 
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disability benefits. 
Petitioner is a 50 year old woman with a Bachelor's degree in psychology from the 
University of Utah in 1975. Petitioner's Memorandum, at 2. Petitioner was a former 
employee of the State Health Department from 1987 through July 1998 as a Family/Child 
Care Specialist. Id. The Board's Long-Term Disability Program ("LTD Program") 
granted Petitioner a two year own occupation disability benefit from October 1998 
through September 2000. Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit. 1-a. In order to determine 
Petitioner's capacity to physically perform work-like tasks, and to determine if permanent 
and total disability existed as defined by Title 49, Chapter 9, a Functional Capacity 
Evaluation was performed on November 16 and 17,2000, by Cory C. Davis, P.T. The 
report concluded the following: 
This general attitude, combined with other observations such 
as excessive and non-anatomical pain drawing, excessively 
low functional status reporting, self limitation without 
observed secondary muscle recruitment, etc. are considered to 
be signs of symptom magnification. In describing symptom 
magnification, I am by no means implying intent. Rather, I 
am simply stating that Ms. Murphy can do more, at times, 
then she currently demonstrates, states or perceives. While 
her subjective reports should not be disregarded, they should 
be considered within the context of symptom magnification 
findings. 
By performing lifting and carrying activities as outlined in the 
chart above, Ms. Murphy demonstrated average functional 
abilities in LIGHT Physical Demand Characteristic of 
Work Level according to the U.S. Depart, of Labor. She 
demonstrated good overall body mechanics., utilizing 
functional lower extremity strength well. 
3 
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Respondent Hearing Exhibit A. at 5-6. (Emphasis added.) The LTD Program denied 
Petitioner's application for permanent and total disability benefits following the receipt of 
the report from Mr. Davis opining that Petitioner could physically perform at least "light" 
duty work. Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit 1-e. 
The executive director of the Utah Retirement Systems formally denied the 
Petitioner's appeal for permanent and total disability benefits on July 6, 2001. 
Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit 1-f. Petitioner appealed the executive director's denial of 
permanent and total disability benefits. Petitioner's Request for Board Action at 1. 
At the hearing, both Petitioner and Dr. Lucinda Bateman testified that Petitioner's 
worst and most difficult problems were pain and fatigue. Tr: 27: 1-6; 68: 1-6. Dr. 
Bateman testified that there was no objective way in which to measure Petitioner's pain 
and fatigue, but that she relied on Petitioner's self-reported symptoms. Tr: 81: 18-25; 82: 
1-7. Dr. Bateman testified that she was not an employment specialist and did not know 
the legal standards for disability in this case. Tr: 80: 2-16. Dr. Bateman could not 
provide an opinion about Petitioner's specific physical abilities. She only provided a 
general opinion about individuals who suffer from fibromyalgia from her "experience." 
Tr: 70: 5-8; 71:9-13. Dr. Bateman failed to provide Petitioner with an impairment rating 
pursuant to the American Medical Association Guidelines or provide an opinion that 
Petitioner met the standard for "total disability" under U.C.A. § 49-9-103(9) based on her 
diagnoses. Tr: 77: 3-8. Dr. Bateman was the only health care professional Petitioner 
4 
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called to testify at the hearing. Tr: 37: 1-20. 
Following the hearing and after reviewing briefs from both parties, the Board's 
hearing officer determined that Petitioner failed to meet the standards for "total disability" 
under U.C.A. § 49-9-103(9). Decision, dated June 28, 2002. Petitioner appealed the 
Board's Order of September 26, 2002, to this Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The Board properly admitted Petitioner's documents into evidence and considered 
such evidence in determining that Petitioner failed to meet the statutory standard of 
"total disability." The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding 
the hearsay rule were correctly applied and should not be reversed. 
2. The Board properly interpreted the statutory burden of proof under U.C.A. §49-1-
610(3) placing it squarely on the Petitioner to prove "total disability." Petitioner's 
request for the Court to apply a different standard or burden to the Board must be 
rejected as a matter of law. Petitioner mistakenly assumes that Worker's 
Compensation or Social Security disability laws are the most applicable laws to the 
Board's determination. Yet, even if some non-statutory shifting burden applied, 
Petitioner cannot prevail on a claim for "total disability" because Petitioner cannot 
prove a medically determinable impairment. 
3. The Board's decision denying Petitioner disability benefits was supported by 
substantial evidence. The hearing officer heard testimony from the Board's 
5 
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witness, Mr. Cory Davis, that Petitioner could physically perform employment 
tasks in at least the sedentary category Additionally, Dr. Bateman testified ihn+ 
rcuuonu s tiaiitis VUJI Min»)ccli\r JIIII numb I'liiiiiiiinii 1 uni uni piou i iiiictk iiih, 
ARGUMENT 
I The Board Properly Considered Petitioner's Evidence. Including Hearsay 
Evidence, in Determining that Petitioner Failed to Meet the Statutory Standard for 
"Total Disability" Under U.C.A. S 49-9-103(9). . 
Petitioner provided no evidence HI IHT objections, 1101 in her brief that the 
Administrative Hearing Officer failed to consider any evidence presented by Petitioriei , 
01 that any error of law was made by the Hearing Officer in considering evidence 
presented b> Fclitionci In iui I, IMilionti spa iln M\ .iiliiiits that her exhibits \ v ei e 
r *i\{u\ mi HI in i ei iiJi'iicc Appellate Brief, :i" I I 
Petitioner's Brief contradicts itself claiming in one place that the hearing officer 
"failed to consider" Petitioner's medical records, and in another, that the disputed records 
were specifics.. * admitted .... L\ UCU^ reuuoner s summan „-i /Argument stau >. 
I n e ^ ^ ' . t -'osieoaii^ J, . IH c- ...e. .liiij. s!c ircatnici i i he.! .•• 
evid^ ^ ii administratis ,..>... nngs when it fan*-.1 \o consider med i^ 
records and medical statements as evidence oi \ h . Murphy's ph\sical 
impairments. 
Appellate But a ,, . • . uioner states in lu; * u i-
Ine Board offered no objections at the hearing to any of the 
documents or medical statements submitted as evidence, and all twon* 
of Ms. Murphy's exhibits were admitted into evidence. 
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Id, at 11; TR. 3:22 - 7:6. Such inconsistencies are confusing to the Board and no doubt to 
this Court. If Petitioner is asserting that her evidence was not admitted by the Hearing 
Officer, it simply is not true and is evidenced by the record. Id. Petitioner apparently 
erroneously believes that silence by the Board regarding Petitioner's exhibits constitutes 
non-consideration. 
These hearsay exhibits went to the weight of the evidence and not to their 
admissibility. That the Hearing Officer failed to find these exhibits persuasive is clear 
from his decision when he states that "The evidence presented by Petitioner did not meet 
the requirements established by the Utah State Legislature in order to be entitled to long-
term disability benefits." Decision, dated June 28, 2002. This is hardly a lack of 
consideration of Petitioner's evidence. On the contrary, the Hearing Officer clearly did 
"consider" Petitioner's evidence and determined that it did not meet the criteria for "total 
disability" under the statute. 
Petitioner complains that the Board's Finding of Fact #6 was incorrect as a matter 
of law. It is unclear how a finding of fact can be incorrect as a matter of law - and as to 
what Petitioner's specific objection is to this Finding. Petitioner may only be granted 
relief from an appeal of a Finding of Fact if, on the basis of the factual record, the court 
determines that she has been prejudiced by Board action that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. U.C.A. § 
63-46b-16(4)(g). The Appellate Court does not conduct a de novo credibility 
7 
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determination or reweigh the evidence. Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 850 
P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Nor will an agency's findings of fact be overturned if 
based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is 
permissible. Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm'n. 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 
(Utah 1988). It is the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve 
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same 
evidence, it is for the agency to draw the inference. Albertons Inc. v. Department of 
Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 1993). 
Petitioner objects to the Finding of Facts #6 in the Board's Order which states, 
6. Petitioner failed to provide any non-hearsay evidence showing she 
maintained any medically determinable physical impairment from accepted clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 
Order, dated September 26,2002, Findings of Fact, p.3. This statement correctly reflects 
the evidence in this case. It clearly states that all of Petitioner's evidence of her alleged 
impairment was either 1) hearsay, or 2) failed to use accepted clinical and laboratory 
diagnostic techniques. The issue is not, as Petitioner defined it, whether Petitioner 
provided evidence that she was tired and achy. The issue is whether substantial evidence 
existed to find that Petitioner's evidence was either 1) hearsay, or 2) failed to show 
"medically determinable physical impairment." 
The sum total of Petitioner's evidence in this matter is the testimony of Petitioner 
and Dr. Lucinda Bateman, and the medical records which Petitioner placed into evidence. 
8 
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The medical records are out of court statements attempting to prove the matter asserted, 
and thus qualify as hearsay under Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Therefore, the 
only open question regarding the accuracy of Finding #6 is whether Petitioner's 
witnesses' testimony proved medically determinable physical impairment using accepted 
clinical diagnostic techniques. 
As Petitioner testified that she is not a doctor and not qualified to testify medically 
her testimony, while relevant, is not evidence of impairment using accepted clinical and 
laboratory diagnostic techniques. TR 33:10-17. Petitioner did call a physician to testify. 
Strangely, Petitioner did not call not her treating physician, but a consulting physician, Dr. 
Lucinda Bateman, who had seen Petitioner on only two occasions, and spent very little 
time with Petitioner. Dr. Bateman, while qualified to testify to Petitioner's alleged 
impairment, failed to perform any objective tests on Petitioner or to provide any accepted 
diagnostic evidence of her alleged impairments. After discussing the latest objective tests 
for fibromyalgia, Dr. Bateman was asked, 
Q: Now, did you test Ms. Murphy for any of those -
A: No, because it's irrelevant. Because they're expensive and it doesn't alter my 
treatment. Nor does it make the diagnosis, because they're not considered as - you 
know, it's not an accurate enough test for predictability, it's insensitive and 
nonspecific. It's not used clinically. 
Q: So you don't really know if she suffers from those problems, you were just 
talking about fibromyalgia patients in general? 
A: That's correct...." 
9 
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TR. 69:22 - 70:8. Later Dr. Bateman was asked concerning the objective criteria for 
Petitioner's alleged diagnosis of fibromyalgia through her pain and fatigue, 
Q: And when you diagnose pain or fatigue, are those objective observations or are 
they subjective, as to what the patient describes? 
A: By definition they're subjective. I believe that indirectly you can get objective 
data, but it has to do with looking at performance, looking at what they've been 
able to do, and see if their symptoms are consistent. But by its very nature, 
fibromyalgia, its complete diagnosis, its clinical diagnosis and everything about it 
is subjective.... I talked to you about lots of objective data used on a research 
basis, it just has not evolved to the point where it's used clinically." 
TR. 81:18-82:7. Dr. Bateman's own statements show that no objective tests are 
currently accepted for fibromyalgia and she freely admits that her conclusions are 
completely based on Petitioner's self-described symptoms of pain and fatigue. Dr. 
Bateman provided no objective basis for her diagnosis of fibromyalgia, nor did any of the 
hearsay records provide objective evidence of Petitioner's alleged aches and pains. As 
such, the Board's Order finding as a fact that Petitioner provided no "non-hearsay 
evidence showing she maintained any medically determinable physical impairment from 
accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" was both accurate and proper. 
Therefore, this Court should find that "substantial evidence" existed for the Board's 
Finding of Fact #6. 
Likewise, the Board's Conclusion of Law #3 was also absolutely correct. It is 
unclear from her Brief whether Petitioner specifically objects to this Conclusion or not. It 
states, 
10 
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3. In formal administrative adjudicative proceedings, "A finding of fact that 
was contested may not be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that 
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence." U.C.A. § 63-
46b-10(3). 
The Board conducts formal adjudicative proceedings under U.C.A. § 49-1-610. 
Such proceedings are governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") 
under Title 63, Chapter 46b. The Board's Conclusion of Law was a direct quote from the 
applicable UAPA statute regarding the rule for hearsay in formal administrative 
proceedings. Petitioner provided no reasoning or evidence why this conclusion was 
incorrect or why the UAPA rules for formal administrative hearings do not apply. Hence, 
the Court should find that the Board's Conclusion of Law #3 was correct as a matter of 
law. 
In sum, the Board specifically admitted Petitioner's hearsay exhibits, provided 
"substantial evidence" to support its finding of fact, and correctly applied the UAPA rule 
regarding hearsay in its conclusions of law. Therefore, Petitioner's complaint that the 
Board failed to "consider" her hearsay evidence must be denied. 
II. The Board Properly Interpreted Utah Law in Determining that Petitioner 
Bore the Burden of Proof Under U.C.A. $ 49-1-610(3) to Prove She Met 
the Statutory Standard for "Total Disability." 
U.C.A. § 49-1-610(4) imposes the burden of proof upon a Petitioner before the 
Board to show that they are entitled to relief. Despite this clear rule, Petitioner repeatedly 
asked the Board's Hearing Officer, and now asks this Court, to ignore Utah law imposing 
the burden of proof in Board administrative hearings on the Petitioner and to apply a 
11 
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different burden of proof to the Board, or apply some other shifting burden of proof in 
disability hearings. See, Petitioner's Memorandum Closing Arguments, at 5-7 and 
Appellate Brief at 15. In essence Petitioner requests that this Court inappropriately 
rewrite the statutes governing the Board's administrative hearings providing a different 
burden of proof. 
A. The Board Correctly Interpreted Statutes Imposing the Burden of Proof on 
Petitioner to Show She Met the Standards for "Total Disability." 
Petitioner's complaint that the Board failed to apply the correct burden of proof 
centers around the Board's Order, Conclusion of Law #1 which states, 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-610 and §49-9-401, Petitioner bears the 
burden of proof in this matter. The Utah State Retirement Board is not subject to 
any state or federal statute, rule, or common law, such as any shifting burden 
standard, in determining whether a Petitioner qualifies for long-term disability 
benefits under Utah Code Annotated, Title 49. 
Order, dated September 26,2002, Conclusions of Law, p.3. As with the Board's other 
Conclusions of Law, this Conclusion is absolutely correct. 
U.C.A. § 49-1-610(4), states, "the moving party in any proceeding brought under 
this section shall bear the burden of proof." U.C.A. § 49-9-401. This statute has not been 
previously interpreted by the Utah Courts and stands on its own to be interpreted via its 
plain language. It is well settled Utah law that when statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous the courts will not contradict its plain meaning. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 
857 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1993)("Specifically, we will not interpret unambiguous language 
in a statute to contradict its plain meaning."); See also. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement 
12 
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BdL, 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988)("A fundamental principle of statutory construction is 
that unambiguous language in the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict 
its plain meaning.") 
Given this statute imposing the burden of proof on the "moving party," the sole 
issue in the hearing before the board was whether Petitioner proved by a preponderance 
of evidence that she met the qualifications for "total disability" as that term is defined 
under U.C.A. § 49-9-103(9). "Total Disability" is defined in U.C.A. § 49-9-103(9) in 
relevant part as "the complete inability, based solely on medically determinable physical 
impairment, to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable, considering the 
employee's education, training, and experience." 
Thus, Petitioner, in order to prevail at a hearing for disability benefits, is required 
as a matter of law under the plain meaning of Title 49, to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 1) she suffers from "medically determinable physical impairment", and 2) due 
solely to her impairment she is completely unable to perform any gainful occupation 
which is reasonable, considering her education, training, and experience. Petitioner can 
prove neither. 
B. Petitioner Makes Faulty Assumptions In Arguing the Board Must 
Determine Reasonableness. 
Petitioner's argument that the Board has the burden to determine the 
"reasonableness" of employment for Petitioner suffers from at least four faulty 
assumptions. First, Petitioner incorrectly asserts that the Board failed to determine 
13 
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"reasonable employment" when it determined that Petitioner failed to meet the standards 
for "total disability." Second, Petitioner wrongfully presumes that the Board assumed the 
burden of proof in denying Petitioner disability benefits prior to the hearing. Third, 
Petitioner incorrectly claims that Social Security and Worker's Compensation laws are the 
most applicable laws to the Board's determination. Fourth, even if some non-statutory 
shifting burden applied, Petitioner assumes the Board must make findings of fact 
regarding reasonableness in each disability case even if Petitioner cannot prove a 
medically determinable impairment. 
First, both the Hearing Officer in his decision, and the Board in its Order 
determined the issue of "reasonableness" in concluding that Petitioner failed to prove she 
met the standards for "total disability." Order, dated September 26, 2002, Conclusions of 
Law, p.4. U.C.A. § 49-9-103(9) defines "total disability" as, "the complete inability, 
based solely on medically determinable physical impairment, to engage in any gainful 
occupation which is reasonable, considering the employee's education, training, and 
experience." In finding that Petitioner failed to meet this standard, it may be presumed 
that the Board considered the "reasonableness" of employment Petitioner could perform 
since it is part of the definition of "total disability." The Board is unaware of any law or 
requirement that it dissect statutory standards and make findings concerning each 
individual term of the statute. For example, the Board, in making its findings of did not 
make specific individual findings concerning the statutory interpretation of the words 
14 
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"complete," "solely," "gainful occupation," "education," "training," or "experience," but 
rather made a specific finding that Petitioner failed to meet the standards for "total 
disability." Placing a burden on the Board to interpret every piece of every statute used in 
making its determination is overly burdensome and pointless. As no vocational experts 
testified at the hearing and neither Petitioner nor the Board provided vocational evidence, 
Petitioner's claim that the Board erred as a matter of law in determining "reasonableness" 
is incorrect. 
Second, Petitioner wrongly assumes that the Board's LTD Program maintains and 
accepts a burden to prove Petitioner's vocational abilities prior to denying her benefits. 
No such burden exists in the statute, board rule, board resolution, nor in the LTD Master 
Policy. The Board denies it maintains any such burden before, during or after a hearing 
by a Petitioner. While Petitioner points to the long-term disability determination process 
as evidence of the LTD Program's acceptance of a burden to prove functional vocational 
inability, Petitioner confuses the LTD Program's requirement to determine whether a 
Petitioner meets the standards for "total disability" and the Petitioner's requirement to 
prove she meets the standards for "total disability." The Board's LTD Program maintains 
no burden, at any time, to prove that Petitioner does not meet the statutory standards for 
"total disability." The burden to prove that Petitioner meets the statutory standard for 
"total disability" rests solely and completely with Petitioner. 
Third, Petitioner's assertions that the Board's process is much like Social Security 
15 
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or Worker's Compensation is a red herring designed to try and divert the Court's attention 
from the statutory standard imposing the burden of proof squarely on the Petitioner to 
prove "total disability." While the Board's governing statutes stand on their own and 
must be interpreted on their own, the closest analogous body of law to the Boards's 
disability determination process are private disability plans governed by the Employees' 
Retirement Income and Security Act ("ERISA"). Although the Board's long-term 
disability, being a governmental plan under the IRS Code, is specifically exempt from 
federal ERISA requirements, the Board acts much more like a private disability plan than 
either a Worker's Compensation plan or Social Security. 
The United States Supreme Court adopted the rule in ERISA cases that a plan's 
decision concerning benefits will be upheld unless a Plaintiff can show that the plan acted 
in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner in denying benefits under the plan document. 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch. 109 S.Ct. 948 (1989). This standard has been 
followed by the 10th Circuit. See, e.g., Siemon v. AT&T Corp.. 117 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 
1997)(upholding a denial of disability benefits where plan did not interpret plan document 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner). In this case, Chapter 9 of Title 49 acts as a type of 
Plan Document. Applying the Firestone standard, Petitioner would be required to show 
that the Board acted in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner in denying disability benefits 
to Petitioner. As the Board reasonably determined that Petitioner failed to meet the 
statutory standard for "total disability" after a full and fair hearing, the Board did not act 
16 
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in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Therefore, under the most analogous disability 
law, the Board's determination that Petitioner failed to meet the standard for "total 
disability" must be upheld. 
Lastly, Petitioner makes a faulty assumption that the Board must reach a 
determination of "reasonableness" even if Petitioner cannot prove "medically 
determinable impairment." Even if this Court requires the LTD Program to prove the 
"reasonableness" of gainful employment as Petitioner requests under Worker's 
Compensation and Social Security laws, Petitioner must prove impairment through 
objective medical evidence prior to the burden shifting to the agency to prove reasonable 
employment. As the Board found that Petitioner did not prove "objective medical 
impairment," the issue of whether the Board could or could not prove vocational 
reasonableness becomes moot even under Worker's Compensation and Social Security 
laws. It makes no sense to claim that a Petitioner suffers from no objective impairment, 
but the Board must still prove the reasonableness of employment she may pursue. 
Therefore, given the plain statutes placing the burden of proof squarely on the 
Petitioner to prove she meets the standard for total disability, and given Petitioner's 
multiple faulty assumptions that the Board has the burden to show the "reasonableness" 
of gainful employment, this Court must find that the Board correctly interpreted that 
Petitioner bears the burden of proof to show "total disability" under Title 49. 
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III. The Board's Order Denying Petitioner Disability Benefits for Her Failure to 
Meet the Statutory Standard for "Total Disability" Is Supported By 
Substantial Evidence. 
The Board's decision denying Petitioner disability benefits is supported by 
substantial evidence. Petitioner may only be granted relief from the Board's decision if, 
on the basis of the factual record, the Court determines that she has been prejudiced by 
Board action that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the Court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
The Appellate Court does not conduct a de novo credibility determination or 
reweigh the evidence. Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1175,1178 
(Utah 1993), nor will an agency's findings of fact be overturned if based on substantial 
evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible Hurley v. Board of 
Review of Industrial Common, 767 P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 1988.) It is the province of 
the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the agency to draw 
the inference. Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Emplovment Security. 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
A. Petitioner Failed to Prove Physical Objective Medical Impairment. 
Petitioner provided no evidence through accepted clinical diagnostic techniques 
that she suffers from any objective medically determinable impairment. While Petitioner 
has provided a laundry list of diagnoses and subjective complaints, these do not constitute 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a "medically determinable impairment." "Medically determinable impairment" is defined 
in U.C.A. § 49-9-103(6) as, "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, 
or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and 
laboratory diagnostic techniques. A physical or mental impairment must be established by 
medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by the 
individual's statement or symptoms." Hence, Petitioner cannot prove impairment simply 
by reporting diagnoses or using self-reported symptoms, she must use accepted "clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques" which show "anatomical" or "physiological" 
abnormalities. 
Petitioner, even with her multiple physicians and medical records, failed to provide 
any evidence of medically determinable physical impairment that was not based on her 
self-reported signs and symptoms. While both Petitioner and her "consulting specialist" 
Dr. Bateman testified at the hearing that Petitioner's main complaints are pain and 
fatigue, Petitioner provided no objective proof of such symptoms but merely parroted the 
reports by the Petitioner herself. Dr. Bateman admitted to specifically not performing any 
objective tests on Petitioner to prove impairment. She stated when asked about these 
objective tests for pain and fatigue, 
Q: Now, did you test Ms Murphy for any of those -
A: No, because it's irrelevant. Because they're expensive and it doesn't alter 
my treatment. Nor does it make the diagnosis, because they're not 
considered as - you know, it's not an accurate enough test for predictability, 
it's insensitive and nonspecific. It's not used clinically. 
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TR. 69: 22 - 70: 3. 
Petitioner has provided no test, laboratory, or diagnostic technique which shows 
objective impairment, nor has she shown any objective inability to perform gainful 
employment. Additionally, Petitioner seems confused concerning the difference between 
a diagnosis and an impairment since Petitioner seems to assume that if she can prove a 
diagnosis, she has shown "physical impairment." This is not true. "Impairment" 
necessarily implies a functional inability to do something, not merely a statement of 
subjective pain and fatigue. Even Petitioner's own witness, Dr. Bateman, agreed that in 
order to determine impairment you have to look "at what they've been able to do, and see 
if their symptoms are consistent" TR. 81:23-24. This type of examination is exactly what 
the Board did in having Petitioner examined by Mr. Cory Davis, a physical therapist. 
Although Petitioner failed to provide evidence of physical impairment, the LTD 
Program gave Petitioner the benefit of the doubt and had the Petitioner's physical 
functional capacity tested by Mr. Cory Davis, a physical therapist. He testified at the 
hearing that according to the Petitioner's objective abilities, she could physically perform 
"light duty" work. He also testified that the Petitioner, while not a malingerer, could 
perform more physical activities than she perceived of her abilities. Mr. Davis, after 
putting Petitioner through a series of physical tests over a two day period designed to 
simulate certain employment tasks, stated in his report: 
In describing symptom magnification, I am by no means implying intent. 
Rather, I am simply stating that Ms. Murphy can do more, at times, then she 
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currently demonstrates, states or perceives. While her subjective reports 
should not be disregarded, they should be considered within the context of 
symptom magnification findings. 
By performing lifting and carrying activities as outlined in the 
chart above, Ms. Murphy demonstrated average functional 
abilities in LIGHT Physical Demand Characteristic of Work 
Level according to the U.S. Depart, of Labor. She 
demonstrated good overall body mechanics, utilizing 
functional lower extremity strength well. 
Respondent's Hearing Exhibit A, at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
Because Petitioner has failed to show any physical impairment, and because the 
only objective findings show that Petitioner is able to perform "light duty" work, 
Petitioner does not suffer from a "medically determinable physical impairment" and does 
not meet the standard for "total disability." 
B. ' Petitioner Failed to Prove a Complete Inability to Perform Reasonable 
Gainful Employment. 
Even if the Petitioner could have proven a significant physical impairment, she still 
failed to prove that this impairment completely prevents her from engaging in reasonable 
employment. Reasonable employment for this Petitioner should consider the Petitioner's 
education, training and experience. U.C.A. §49-9-103(9). During the hearing, the 
testimony showed that reasonable employment for the Petitioner is sedentary or light duty 
work in a position requiring less than a post-graduate education. The Petitioner, although 
not without some self-perceived physical limitations, could engage in employment which 
meets these fairly lax restrictions since she has done so in the past many years in her 
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previous position as a Family/Child Care Specialist. 
In reviewing Petitioner's educational and work background, Petitioner testified 
that she had a bachelor's degree in psychology from the University of Utah, and was 
successful in her career as a Family/Child Care Specialist. No testimony was heard to 
dispute the fact that engaging in counseling or another similar field requires more than a 
sedentary effort. Thus, given the education, training and experience of the Petitioner, the 
LTD Program correctly determined that the Petitioner does not and cannot meet her 
burden to prove the "complete inability" to perform "any occupation" due to her physical 
impairment. U.C.A. §49-9-103(9). 
C. In Contrast to Petitioner's Lack of Evidence Showing Objective Medical 
Impairment, the Board Provided Substantial Evidence Supporting the 
Hearing Officer's Decision that Petitioner Failed to Meet the Statutory 
Requirements for Total Disability. 
The Board's decision denying Petitioner disability benefits was supported by 
substantial evidence. The hearing officer heard testimony from the Board's witness, Mr. 
Cory Davis, that Petitioner could physically perform employment tasks in at least the 
sedentary category. On Direct examination Mr. Davis testified, 
Q: And is it your opinion that [Petitioner] is able to perform, physically 
perform some occupation based on your observations? 
A: Based on what I - what I observed, I felt that she would be capable of a 
light, and probably more comfortably capable of at least a sedentary type 
job. 
TR 102:3-8. Mr. Davis based his conclusion on a two day functional capacity 
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examination performed on the Petitioner. This examination was specifically designed to 
determine whether Petitioner could function in the workplace. 
Mr. Davis5 report specifically concludes, 
By performing lifting and carrying activities as outlined in the chart 
above, Ms. Murphy demonstrated average functional abilities in 
LIGHT Physical Demand Characteristic of Work Level according 
to the U.S. Depart, of Labor. She demonstrated good overall body 
mechanics., utilizing functional lower extremity strength well. 
Respondent's Hearing Exhibit A. at 5-6. Mr. Davis testified at the hearing concerning 
Petitioner's specific restrictions on sitting, standing, walking, and lifting: 
Q: Okay. Going back to the specifics of the report, on page two you talked 
about [Petitioner's] sitting restrictions. What would you say her limitations 
were in sitting? 
A: She sat through the intake interview, over - well, 100 minutes is what I put 
in the report. And repeated that at another time during the test, during 
another activity she again sat for a total of 23 minutes. 
Q: What about her standing limitations? 
A: Standing was fairly consistently self-limited, anywhere from 14 to 19 
minutes were the two instances that we recorded. She felt she - she 
preferred to take breaks and sit after that period of time. 
Q: And walking it says her that she walked for .23 miles on a treadmill. What 
limitations does that - do you perceive from that? 
A: She walked a full ten minutes. Her pace was, by what I would consider, a 
normal pace, just a normal, comfortable walking pace. It was probably 
slightly slow, but not excessively. But she was able to walk that full 
amount of time. She did - she did comment, and I did comment in the 
report that she felt this was the maximum she'd be able to do at one time. 
TR. 96:20 - 97:16. In regards to lifting, Mr. Davis testified: 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q: So on that lifting, this is page four, you have her lifting in - of a box, 12 
inches to a knuckle, 35 pounds? 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: What does that 35 pounds, what does that put - what catagory does that put 
her in? 
A: Thirty-five pounds based on the - the chart that I use for determining where 
people are going to be placed as far as their physical demand characteristic 
of work, would actually be into the median category. 
Q: Higher than the light category? 
A. Yes. 
TR: 100:8-19. 
In addition to Mr. Davis' specific testimony that Petitioner could perform 
sedentary or light duty work, Petitioner's witness, Dr. Bateman, specifically testified that 
Petitioner's complaints of pain and fatigue were subjective and based on Petitioner's own 
statements of signs and symptoms. 
Q: And when you diagnose pain or fatigue, are those objective observations or 
are they subjective, as to what the patient describes? 
A: By definition they're subjective. I believe that indirectly you can get 
objective data, but it has to do with looking at performance, looking at what 
they've been able to do, and see if their symptoms are consistent. But by 
very nature, fibromyalgia, its complete diagnosis, its clinical diagnosis and 
everything about it is subjective. With the exception of tender points, 
which are a feeble attempt to rescue some kind of objective data for these 
patients. That's all we have, except the things I quoted you. I talked to you 
about lots of objective data used on a research basis, it just has not evolved 
to the point where it's used clinically. 
TR. 81:18 - 82:7. Even Dr. Bateman admits that Petitioner's main problems of pain and 
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fatigue are subjective complaints, and cannot be used as the basis for determining a 
"medically determinable impairment." 
Hence, with the only health care professional, Mr. Davis, which testified to 
Petitioner's specific physical abilities opining that Petitioner could perform sedentary or 
light duty work following an exhaustive two day examination, and with Petitioner's own 
"consulting" physician admitting that pain and fatigue are subjective diagnoses, the Board 
presented substantial evidence to support its decision that Petitioner failed to meet the 
statutory standard for "total disability." 
CONCLUSION 
The Board hereby asks this Court to reject Petitioner's appeal in its entirety. 
Petitioner failed to show that the Board misapplied the hearsay rule in its Order. 
Petitioner failed to show that the Board incorrectly applied the burden of proof in its 
Order. Finally, Petitioner failed to show prove that the Board did not provide substantial 
evidence in determining that Petitioner failed to meet the criteria for "total disability" 
under U.C.A. § 49-9-103(9). 
DATED this ftday of September, 2003. 
DAVID B.HANSEN 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
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UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 49-1-611 
^ « p sum or in monthly amounts, and the total of the 
KTyments
 So made shall be a full discharge and release to the 
*stem from any further claims. 
(2) All continuing monthly benefits payable to beneficiaries 
lupon the death of an active member shall be paid on the first 
'day of the month following the date of death of the member. 
1997 
49-1-608. Benefits and money in the fund exempt from 
taxation — Exceptions. 
The benefits accrued or paid to any beneficiary of any 
system administered by the retirement office and the accumu-
lated contributions, money, and securities in the fund created 
by this title are exempt from any state, county, or municipal 
tax, except that the retirement allowance, a refund of contri-
butions, or other benefits subject to the federal income tax, 
which are received by a member or beneficiary of any system 
administered by the board and which have not been taxed is 
subject to Title 59, Chapter 10. 1989 
49-1-609. Nonassignability of benefits or payments — 
Exemption from legal process — Deduction of 
amounts owed. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4), the right of any 
member or beneficiary to any benefit, payment, or any other 
right accrued or accruing to any person under this title and 
the assets of the fund created by this title are not subject to 
alienation or assignment by the member or beneficiary and 
are not subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, or any 
other legal or equitable process. 
(2) This section may not be construed to prohibit the 
administrator from deducting medical or other insurance 
premiums from a retirant's allowance as requested by the 
retirant providing that any request is within limitations and 
rules prescribed by the board. 
(3) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the retirement 
board shall provide for the division of a member's service 
retirement allowance, continuing monthly death benefit, 
or refund of contributions upon termination to former 
spouses and family members pursuant to an order of a 
court of competent jurisdiction with respect to domestic 
relations matters on file with the retirement office. 
(b) The court order shall specify the manner in which 
the retirement allowance or refund of contributions shall 
be partitioned, whether as a fixed amount or as a percent-
age of the benefit. 
(c) The board may also provide for the division of a 
member's defined contribution account. 
(d) Once benefit payments under a domestic relations 
order begin, the period for which the payment shall be 
made may not be altered. 
(e) Benefit payments to an alternate payee shall begin 
at the time the member or beneficiary begins receiving 
benefit payments. 
(f) The alternate payee shall receive benefits in the 
same form as benefits are received by the member. 
(g) The board shall make rules to implement this 
section. 
(4) In accordance with federal law, the board may deduct 
the required amount from any benefit, payment, or other right 
accrued or accruing to any member of a system, plan, or 
program under this title to offset any amount that member 
owes to a system, plan, or program administered by the board. 
2001 
49-1-610. Right of appeal to hearing officer — Council 
review of hearings — Further board review — 
Rules of procedure applied — Judicial re-
view. 
(1) (a) All members of a system, plan, or program under 
this title shall acquaint themselves with their rights and 
obligations as members. 
(b) A member shall request a ruling by the administra-
tor on any benefit claim or legal right under this title. 
(c) Any person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the 
administrator with respect to any benefit claim or legal 
right under any system, plan, or program under this title 
shall request a review of that claim by a hearing officer. 
(d) The hearing officer shall: 
(i) be hired by the executive director after consul-
tation and review with the membership council; and 
(ii) follow the procedures and requirements of Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(2) (a) (i) The hearing officer shall hear and determine all 
facts pertaining to applications for benefits under any 
retirement system, plan, or program under this title 
and all matters pertaining to the administration of 
the system. 
(ii) The membership council may examine the 
record of the hearing, provide a recommendation to 
the board, and recommend any necessary changes in 
retirement policy or procedure to the Legislature, 
(b) (i) If the executive officer of the board cannot de-
termine from the records or other information avail-
able the length of service, compensation, or age of any 
member, the executive officer may estimate, for the 
purpose of any determination required to be made, 
any of these factors. 
(ii) The board shall review all decisions of the 
hearing officer. 
(3) The moving party in any proceeding brought under this 
section shall bear the burden of proof. 
(4) Any applicant may file an application for reconsidera-
tion according to the procedures and requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, upon any of the 
following grounds: 
(a) that the board acted in excess of its powers; 
(b) that the order or award was procured by fraud; 
(c) that the evidence does not justify the determination 
of the board; or 
(d) that the applicant has discovered new material 
evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
been discovered or procured at the hearing. 
(5) A member aggrieved by the board's decision may obtain 
judicial review by complying with the procedures and require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act. 2001 
49-1-611. Additional plans authorized — Subject to 
federal and state laws — Rules to implement 
this provision — Costs of administration — 
Limitations on eligibility — Protection of tax 
status. 
(1) The board may establish and administer additional 
benefit plans under Sections 401(k) and 457 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, Employee and employer contributions shall be 
permitted according to the provisions of these plans as estab-
lished by the board. The amount of these accumulated contri-
butions, together with dividend or interest credits, are vested 
in the member, and are nonforfeitable. 
(2) Earnings credited to accounts established as a result of 
this action shall be at a rate fixed by the board. 
(3) Contributions shall be invested as provided by contract 
in accordance with federal and state law. 
(4) The board may establish rules to implement and admin-
ister this section. Costs of administration may be paid from 
the interest earnings of the funds accrued as a result of 
deposits or as an assessment against each account, to be 
decided by the board. All funds and deposits may be invested 
as a separate account or accounts in the Utah State Retire-
ment Investment Fund. 
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49-9-103 UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 
under the Public Safety Retirement Act who are covered under 
a long-term disability program offered by a political subdivi-
sion which is substantially equivalent to the program offered 
by the state under this chapter. The program shall be admin-
istered by the executive officer of the board through the 
retirement office, under the policies and rules promulgated by 
the board. 1987 
49-9-103. Definitions. 
(1) "Date of disability" means the date on which a period of 
continuous disability commences, and may not commence on 
or before the last day of actual work. 
(2) "Educational institution" means a political subdivision 
or an instrumentality of a political subdivision, an instrumen-
tality of the state, or any combination of these entities, which 
is primarily engaged in educational activities or the adminis-
tration or servicing of educational activities. The term in-
cludes the State Board of Education and any instrumentality 
of the State Board of Education, institutions of higher educa-
tion and their branches, school districts, and vocational and 
technical schools. 
(3) "Elimination period" means the three months at the 
beginning of each continuous period of total disability for 
which no benefit will be paid and commences with the date of 
disability. 
(4) "Employee" means any regular full-time employee of an 
employer who participates in any system administered by the 
board, except those employees exempt from coverage under 
Section 49-9-102. 
(5) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum period 
of time the monthly disability income benefit will be paid for 
any continuous period of total disability. 
(6) "Medically determinable impairment" means an impair-
ment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psycho-
logical abnormalities which can be shown by medically accept-
able clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. A physical 
or mental impairment must be established by medical evi-
dence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, 
not only by the individual's statement of symptoms. 
(7) "Physician" means a legally qualified physician. 
(8) "Rehabilitative employment" means any board-ap-
proved occupation or employment for wage or profit, for which 
the employee is reasonably qualified by education, training, or 
experience, in which the employee engages while unable to 
perform his occupation as a result of injury or illness. 
(9) "Total disability" means the complete inability, due to 
medically determinable physical or mental impairment, to 
engage in the employee's regular occupation during the elimi-
nation period and the first 24 months of disability benefits. 
Thereafter, "total disability" means the complete inability, 
based solely on medically determinable physical impairment, 
to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable, 
considering the employee's education, training, and experi-
ence. "Total disability" exists only if during any period of "total 
disability" the employee is under the regular care of a physi-
cian other than the employee. 2000 
PART 2 
THE PROGRAM AND FUND 
49-9-201. Creation of program. 
There is created for employees of employers participating in 
any system administered by the board, unless otherwise 
exempted under this chapter, the "Public Employees' Long 
Term Disability Program." 1988 
49-9-202. Creation of trust fund. 
There is created the "Public Employees' Disability Trust 
Fund" for the purpose of paying the benefits and costs of 
administering this program. The fund shall consist of all 
money paid into it in accordance with this chapter, whether in 
the form of cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money 
received from any other source. Custody, management, and 
investment of the fund shall be governed by Title 49, Chapter 
49-9-203. Eligibility for membership in the program. 
(1) All employers participating in any system administered 
by the board may cover their employees under this chapter, 
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement 
Act. 
(2) If an employer elects to cover any of his eligible employ-
ees under this chapter, all of those employees shall be covered, 
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement 
Act. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any political subdivi-
sion or educational institution to be covered by this chapter. 
PART 3 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
49-9-301. Contributions to fund program — Adjust-
ment of premium rate. 
(1) During each legislative session, the board shall certify 
to the Legislature the employer paid premium rate expressed 
as a percentage of salary which is required to fund the Public 
Employees' Disability Trust Fund. 
(2) Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall 
adjust the premium rate to maintain adequate funding for the 
disability trust fund. 1994 
49-9-302. Rates established on basis of agency experi-
ence — Limitations — Annual report to gov-
ernor and Legislature. 
The board shall establish the contribution rate based on the 
experience of the various public agencies and political subdi-
visions participating in the program, which rate may not 
exceed 1% of salaries and wages and shall report annually to 
the governor and the Legislature the current contribution 




49-9-401. Disability benefits — Proof required — Eligi-
bility. 
(1) Upon receipt of proof by the board from the employer 
that an employee has become totally disabled as a result of: 
(a) accidental bodily injury which is the sole cause of 
disability and is sustained while this chapter is in force; 
(b) disease or illness causing total disability commenc-
ing while this chapter is in force; or 
(c) physical injury resulting from external force or 
violence as a result of the performance of duty, the fund 
will pay to the employee a monthly disability benefit for 
each month the total disability continues beyond the 
elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benefit 
period. 
(2) Successive periods of disability which: (a) result from 
the same or related causes, (b) are separated by less than six 
months of continuous full-time work at the individual's usual 
place of employment, and (c) commence while the individual is 
an employee covered by this chapter, shall be considered as a 
single period of disability. The inability to work for a period 
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49-9-103 UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 
under the Public Safety Retirement Act who are covered under 
a long-term disability program offered by a political subdivi-
sion which is substantially equivalent to the program offered 
by the state under this chapter. The program shall be admin-
istered by the executive officer of the board through the 
retirement office, under the policies and rules promulgated by 
the board. 1987 
49-9-103. Definitions. 
(1) "Date of disabilityn means the date on which a period of 
continuous disability commences, and may not commence on 
or before the last day of actual work. 
(2) "Educational institution" means a political subdivision 
or an instrumentality of a political subdivision, an instrumen-
tality of the state, or any combination of these entities, which 
is primarily engaged in educational activities or the adminis-
tration or servicing of educational activities. The term in-
cludes the State Board of Education and any instrumentality 
of the State Board of Education, institutions of higher educa-
tion and their branches, school districts, and vocational and 
technical schools. 
(3) "Elimination period" means the three months at the 
beginning of each continuous period of total disability for 
which no benefit will be paid and commences with the date of 
disability. 
(4) "Employee" means any regular full-time employee of an 
employer who participates in any system administered by the 
board, except those employees exempt from coverage under 
Section 49-9-102. 
(5) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum period 
of time the monthly disability income benefit will be paid for 
any continuous period of total disability. 
(6) "Medically determinable impairment" means an impair-
ment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psycho-
logical abnormalities which can be shown by medically accept-
able clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. A physical 
or mental impairment must be established by medical evi-
dence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, 
not only by the individual's statement of symptoms. 
(7) "Physician" means a legally qualified physician. 
(8) "Rehabilitative employment" means any board-ap-
proved occupation or employment for wage or profit, for which 
the employee is reasonably qualified by education, training, or 
experience, in which the employee engages while unable to 
perform his occupation as a result of injury or illness. 
(9) "Total disability" means the complete inability, due to 
medically determinable physical or mental impairment, to 
engage in the employee's regular occupation during the elimi-
nation period and the first 24 months of disability benefits. 
Thereafter, "total disability" means the complete inability, 
based solely on medically determinable physical impairment, 
to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable, 
considering the employee's education, training, and experi-
ence. "Total disability" exists only if during any period of "total 
disability" the employee is under the regular care of a physi-
cian other than the employee. 2000 
PART 2 
THE PROGRAM AND FUND 
49-9-201. Creation of program. 
There is created for employees of employers participating in 
any system administered by the board, unless otherwise 
exempted under this chapter, the "Public Employees' Long 
Term Disability Program." 1988 
49-9-202. Creation of trust fund. 
There is created the "Public Employees' Disability Trust 
Fund" for the purpose of paying the benefits and costs of 
administering this program. The fund shall consist of all 
money paid into it in accordance with this chapter, whether in 
the form of cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money 
received from any other source. Custody, management, and 
investment of the fund shall be governed by Title 49, Chapter 
l
' 1987 
49-9-203. Eligibility for membership in the program. 
(1) All employers participating in any system administered 
by the board may cover their employees under this chapter 
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement 
Act. 
(2) If an employer elects to cover any of his eligible employ-
ees under this chapter, ail of those employees shall be covered, 
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement 
Act. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any political subdivi-




49-9-301. Contributions to fund program — Adjust-
ment of premium rate. 
(1) During each legislative session, the board shall certify 
to the Legislature the employer paid premium rate expressed 
as a percentage of salary which is required to fund the Public 
Employees' Disability Trust Fund. 
(2) Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall 
adjust the premium rate to maintain adequate funding for the 
disability trust fund. 1994 
49-9-302. Rates established on basis of agency experi-
ence — Limitations — Annual report to gov-
ernor and Legislature. 
The board shall es tabl ish the contribution ra te based on the 
experience of the var ious public agencies and political subdi-
visions part ic ipat ing in t h e program, which ra te may not 
exceed 1% of salar ies a n d wages and shall report annually to 
the governor and the Legis la ture the current contribution 
r a t e s assessed to the public agencies and political subdivi-
sions. 1987 
P A R T 4 
B E N E F I T S 
49-9-401. Disability benefits — Proof required — Eligi-
bility. 
(1) Upon receipt of proof by the board from the employer 
that an employee has become totally disabled as a result of: 
(a) accidental bodily injury which is the sole cause of 
disability and is sustained while this chapter is in force; 
(b) disease or illness causing total disability commenc-
ing while this chapter is in force; or 
(c) physical injury resulting from external force or 
violence as a result of the performance of duty, the fund 
will pay to the employee a monthly disability benefit for 
each month the total disability continues beyond the 
elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benefit 
period. 
(2) Successive periods of disability which: (a) result from 
the same or related causes, (b) are separated by less than six 
months of continuous full-time work at the individual's usual 
place of employment, and (c) commence while the individual is 
an employee covered by this chapter, shall be considered as a 
single period of disability. The inability to work for a period 
less than 15 consecutive days may not be considered as a 
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-9-103 UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 1016 
ie r the Public Safety Retirement Act who are covered under 
ang-term disability program offered by a political subdivi-
n which is substantially equivalent to the program offered 
the state under this chapter. The program shall be admin-
sred by the executive officer of the board through the 
irement office, under the policies and rules promulgated by 
J board. 1987 
•9-103. Definit ions. 
1) "Date of disability" means the date on which a period of 
itinuous disability commences, and may not commence on 
before the last day of actual work. 
2) "Educational institution" means a political subdivision 
an instrumentality of a political subdivision, an instrumen-
ity of the state, or any combination of these entities, which 
primarily engaged in educational activities or the adminis-
ition or servicing of educational activities. The term in-
ldes the State Board of Education and any instrumentality 
the State Board of Education, institutions of higher educa-
>n and their branches, school districts, and vocational and 
:hnical schools. 
(3) "Elimination period" means the three months a t the 
ginning of each continuous period of total disability for 
lich no benefit will be paid and commences with the date of 
sability. 
(4) "Employee" means any regular full-time employee of an 
iployer who participates in any system administered by the 
ard, except those employees exempt from coverage under 
action 49-9-102. 
(5) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum period 
t ime the monthly disability income benefit will be paid for 
ly continuous period of total disability. 
(6) "Medically determinable impairment" means an impair-
ent tha t results from anatomical, physiological, or psycho-
gical abnormalities which can be shown by medically accept-
>le clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. A physical 
• mental impairment must be established by medical evi-
>nce consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, 
jt only by the individual's s tatement of symptoms. 
(7) "Physician" means a legally qualified physician. 
(8) "Rehabilitative employment" means any board-ap-
roved occupation or employment for wage or profit, for which 
le employee is reasonably qualified by education, training, or 
cperience, in which the employee engages while unable to 
erform his occupation as a result of injury or illness. 
(9) "Total disability" means the complete inability, due to 
Ledically determinable physical or mental impairment, to 
ngage in the employee's regular occupation during the elimi-
ation period and the first 24 months of disability benefits, 
hereafter, "total disability" means the complete inability, 
ased solely on medically determinable physical impairment, 
) engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable, 
onsidering the employee's education, training, and experi-
nce. "Tbtal disability" exists only if during any period of "total 
isabiiity" the employee is under the regular care of a physi-
ian other than the employee. 2000 
PART 2 
THE PROGRAM AND FUND 
9-9-201. Creation of program. 
There is created for employees of employers participating in 
my system administered by the board, unless otherwise 
xempted under this chapter, the "Public Employees' Long 
term Disability Program." 1988 
19-9-202. Creation of trust fund. 
There is created the "Public Employees' Disability Trust 
?und" for the purpose of paying the benefits and costs of 
administering this program. The fund shall consist of all 
money paid into it in accordance with this chapter, whether in 
the form of cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money 
received from any other source. Custody, management, and 
investment of the fund shall be governed by Title 49, Chapter 
1. 1987 
49-9-203. Eligibil i ty for membersh ip in the program. 
(1) All employers participating in any system administered 
by the board may cover their employees under this chapter. 
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement 
Act. 
(2) If an employer elects to cover any of his eligible employ-
ees under this chapter, all of those employees shall be covered. 
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement 
Act. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any political subdivi-




49-9-301. Contribut ions to fund program — Adjust-
m e n t of premium rate. 
(1) During each legislative session, the board shall certify 
to the Legislature the employer paid premium rate expressed 
as a percentage of salary which is required to fund the Public 
Employees' Disability Trust Fund. 
(2) Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall 
adjust the premium rate to maintain adequate funding for the 
disability trust fund. 1994 
49-9-302. Rates establ ished on bas is of agency experi-
ence — Limitat ions — Annual report to gov-
ernor and Legislature. 
The board shall establish the contribution rate based on the 
experience of the various public agencies and political subdi-
visions participating in the program, which rate may not 
exceed 1% of salaries and wages and shall report annually to 
the governor and the Legislature the current contribution 
rates assessed to the public agencies and political subdivi-
sions. 1987 
P A R T 4 
BENEFITS 
49-9-401. Disability benefits — Proof required — Eligi-
bility. 
(1) Upon receipt of proof by the board from the employer 
tha t an employee has become totally disabled as a result of: 
(a) accidental bodily injury which is the sole cause of 
disability and is sustained while this chapter is in force; 
(b) disease or illness causing total disability commenc-
ing while this chapter is in force; or 
(c) physical injury resulting from external force or 
violence as a result of the performance of duty, the fund 
will pay to the employee a monthly disability benefit for 
each month the total disability continues beyond the 
elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benent 
period. 
(2) Successive periods of disability which: (a) result fro© 
the same or related causes, (b) are separated by less than si* 
months of continuous full-time work at the individual's usu 
place of employment, and (c) commence while the individual 
an employee covered by this chapter, shall be considered as 
single period of disability. The inability to work for a pen 
less than 15 consecutive days may not be considered as 
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